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ACCIDENT, PROVOCATION AND JURY REFORMS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, there were a number of areas in the criminal law in Queensland in which 
there was law reform activity. These include jury reform, the excuse of accident and 
the defence of provocation.  
 
JURY REFORM 
Trial by jury has been an important part of our legal system particularly in the 
criminal justice system for almost 1,000 years. Recently it has been criticised and 
many jurisdictions have been making changes to the jury system. One aspect which 
has been criticised is the unanimity rule. According to that rule, all members of a jury 
in a criminal trial must unanimously agree with the decision to convict the accused. If 
the jury cannot reach a unanimous verdict, called a hung jury, the jury is discharged 
and a new trial is held if the prosecution decides to continue. There are problems with 
that result which include expense, delay, inconvenience and the emotional toll on the 
victim, accused and witnesses. All the Australian states have introduced majority 
verdicts but they vary in terms of which offences are excluded and how many hours 
of deliberation are required before the jury is allowed to return a majority verdict. 
Jury reform has been in response, in some part, to public outcry to hung juries in some 
high profile cases. An example of such a case is the trial of former Queensland 
Premier, Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen in 1991 for perjury. The foreman of the jury in that 
case was a former president of the Young Nationals party and a strong supporter of 
the defendant. In New South Wales there were two hung juries in the trial of a former 
mayor of Cabramatta before an eventual conviction. Another impetus for jury reform 
has been the impending trials of high profile defendants such as Dr Jayant Patel and 
Denis Ferguson which have resulted in a provision for judge only trials as well as 
majority verdicts. 
In September 2008 Queensland amended the Jury Act 1995 so that unanimous 
verdicts are only required for criminal offences which carry a mandatory life sentence 
(s 59) and majority verdicts are allowed for all other indictable offences. A majority 
verdict can be accepted by the court as long as no more than one juror is in dissent (s 
59A). The judge will only be able to consider a majority verdict after a long 
deliberation of more than eight hours. The judge will determine whether the 
prescribed period has been met. Queensland has also introduced judge only trials in 
the Criminal Code (s 614). It is believed this form of trial would be used for high 
profile prosecutions to avoid problems in the accused getting a fair trial. The 
application by the prosecution would only be successful with the consent of the 
accused and only if the court is satisfied there are special reasons for making such an 
order (s 615). Other jurisdictions, like New South Wales and South Australia, have 
introduced judge only trials. [In fact, one such trial has taken place: R v Schloss, 
unreported, District Court, Ipswich, Koppenol DCJ, 5/11/2008. The defence applied 
for the order. The trial resulted in an acquittal. The proceedings will be the subject of 
a future note. Ed.] 
 
ACCIDENT 
The excuse of accident (Criminal Code, s 23) relieves a person of criminal 
responsibility for an event which occurs by accident. There have been different tests 
of whether an event has occurred by accident. The two most important have been the 
direct and immediate result test and the reasonably foreseeable consequence test. The 
direct and immediate result test was expressed by Townley J in R v Martyr [1962] Qd 
R 398 at 417: 
 
If a person kills or injures another by a ‘willed’ blow with his fist, although the death 
or particular injury is not reasonably foreseeable, the death or injury is not an event 
which occurs by accident. The event occurs by reason of something which is intended 
and not merely accidental. It is the direct and immediate result of an intended act. 
 
 
The reasonably foreseeable consequence test was expressed by the Queensland Court 
of Appeal in R v Van Den Bemd [1995] 1 Qd R 401at 405: 
 
The test of criminal responsibility under s 23 is not whether the death is an 
‘immediate and direct’ consequence of a willed act of the accused, but whether death 
was such an unlikely consequence of that act that an ordinary person would not 
reasonably have foreseen it. 
 
The current formulation of the test of accident has subjective and objective elements 
that must be satisfied before a defendant will not be criminally responsible for an 
event which occurs by accident. They are that the event must not have been intended 
or foreseen by the accused (subjective) and could not reasonably have been foreseen 
by an ordinary person (objective) (Kaporonowski v R (1973) 133 CLR 209). 
The Queensland Law Reform Commission has recommended that the excuse 
of accident not be repealed and by majority that the test not be changed by legislative 
amendment. The majority has also recommended that Criminal Code s 23 (1A) not be 
repealed but be amended to confine its application to unlawful acts. The accident 
defence was referred to the Commission after there was public outcry generated from 
some controversial cases which resulted in the ‘one punch can kill’ campaign. (See R 
v Little; R v Moody and for the campaign see 
http://www.police.qld.gov.au/programs/personalSafety/situationalAdvice/onePunch.ht
m (27 October 2008).) In R v Little the accused was acquitted of murder and 
manslaughter after he had punched the victim in the head. The victim died later in 
hospital from a subarachnoid haemorrhage. The jury was directed on accident, self 
defence, provocation and intoxication. In R v Moody the accused was found not guilty 
of manslaughter after an incident in a taxi queue which resulted in the accused 
punching the victim in the face. The punch broke the victim’s nose which caused 
aspiration and the victim died. Accident and self defence were left to the jury. No 
other jurisdiction in Australia has referred the excuse of accident to a Law Reform 
Commission. However other jurisdictions, like Western Australia, have been 
reviewing the law in relation to homicide. Western Australia introduced a new 
offence of assault causing death. A similar provision was attempted to be introduced 
in Queensland by the Shadow Attorney General. (See Second Reading Speech, 
Criminal Code (Assault Causing Death) Amendment Bill 2007 (Qld): Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, 9 August 2007, 2465 (Mr Mark McArdle, Shadow Attorney-
General and Shadow Minister for Justice).) The amendment was defeated. The excuse 
of accident would not have applied to the new offence. The Queensland Law Reform 
Commission has recommended against the introduction of the new offence. (See 
QLRC, A Review on the Excuse of Accident and the Defence of Provocation, Report 
No 64, September 2008, 205.) 
 
 
PROVOCATION 
Provocation is a defence which reduces the offence of murder to manslaughter 
(Criminal Code, s 304). It can also be used as a complete defence to other offences of 
which assault is an element (Criminal Code, ss 268 & 269). Provocation under s 304 
involves the loss of self control in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation, 
and before there is time for the passion to cool. Even though there may have been an 
intent to kill it can be seen that, in some circumstances, it is not appropriate to classify 
the offence as murder. It is not that the killing is justified but that it is partially 
excused. In the circumstances, the response (which resulted in the death) is within the 
normal range of behaviour which can be expected of the ordinary person. The defence 
represents an acknowledgment of human frailty. This is the traditional view of the 
law. (See Mirko Bagaric and Kenneth Arenson, Criminal Laws in Australia, (2nd ed, 
2007) 134.) The origins of the defence of provocation lie in the desire to mitigate the 
harshness of the penalty for the offence of murder. When the penalty was death, often 
provocation was a way of reducing the punishment to life imprisonment. Many 
jurisdictions have now abolished the defence of provocation for murder charges, eg 
Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia. 
The defence of provocation was referred to the Queensland Law Reform 
Commission after the case of R v Sebo in which a man was found not guilty of murder 
but guilty of manslaughter after he clubbed to death his 16 year old girlfriend with a 
steering lock. She had taunted him with her infidelity. The same question has already 
been the subject of a review by the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia. It 
recommended that the defence be abolished as well as the mandatory life sentence for 
murder. (See Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Review of the Law of 
Homicide, Final Report (Project 97, September 2007) 222.) As of August 2008 there 
is no longer a partial defence of provocation for murder in Western Australia and the 
mandatory life sentence has been replaced by a presumptive life sentence. The 
Queensland Law Reform Commission reached a difference conclusion. It 
recommended that, given the constraints of the Government’s intention to make no 
change to the mandatory life sentence for murder, the defence of provocation be 
retained. The Commission did recommend that amendments be made to s 304 to 
include a provision to the effect that, other than in circumstances of an extreme and 
exceptional character, the defence of provocation cannot be based on words alone or 
conduct that consists substantially of words nor could it be based upon a deceased’s 
choice about a relationship. The Commission also recommended that consideration be 
given to the development of a separate defence for battered persons. It was also 
recommended that the onus of proof be reversed so that the defendant bears the onus 
of proof of the partial defence of provocation on the balance of probabilities. 
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